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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Punitive damages have long been considered an anomaly in tort law.1  
 
 *  Associate, Pillsbury Winthrop LLP, San Diego; J.D. 2003 (cum laude), University of San Diego School of Law; B.S. 1999, Portland State University.  I thank Jeannette Filippone, Bill Jones, and Ted Fates for the laughter, friendship, and memories that will always be my version of law school, and a special thanks to the best friend anyone could ask for, Amy Wood, whose unrelenting support and encouragement made this Casenote possible.  1. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873) (“The idea is wrong.  It is a monstrous heresy.  It is an unsightly and unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of the law.”); see WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (4th ed. 1971) (referring to punitive damages as anomalous). 
MARTIN.DOC 9/24/2019  4:19 PM 
 
1650 
The sole purpose of civil action is to compensate plaintiffs for the 
damages they suffer at the hands of wrongdoers.2  Punitive damages, 
however, cannot be said to serve a proper compensatory function.3  
Instead, the doctrine of punitive damages permits plaintiffs in civil 
lawsuits to recover damages beyond those that would compensate their 
losses when the defendants’ conduct is determined to have been 
reprehensible.4  As the name implies, punitive damages are a form of 
punishment designed to deter future misconduct by the defendant and 
other potential wrongdoers.5  In this regard, punitive damages are more 
akin to criminal sanctions, for which proceedings are brought on behalf 
 
 2. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 2, at 7 (footnote omitted). 
 3. See James A. Breslo, Taking the Punitive Damage Windfall Away from the 
Plaintiff: An Analysis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1130, 1138 (1992) (“If some plaintiffs are undercompensated by the tort system, that problem should be addressed directly, not through the indirect, arbitrary method of punitive damages.”); Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., 
Punitive Damages, Due Process, and the Jury, 40 ALA. L. REV. 975, 1005 (1989) (“[N]o one today seriously argues that the function of punitive damages is the damages function: compensation for loss.”); James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive 
Damages: A Relic that Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1164–66 (1984); see also id. at 1122 (“The legal rationale that punitive damages serve a compensatory function . . . has ceased to exist.”). 
 4. See Richard A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing 
the Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 42–43 (1983); Justice Janie L. Shores, A Suggestion for Limited Tort Reform: Allocation of 
Punitive Damage Awards to Eliminate Windfalls, 44 ALA. L. REV. 61, 69 & nn.55–57 (1992).  Dean Prosser summarized the typical conduct that warrants punitive damage assessment in this way: Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or “malice,” or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called wilful or wanton.  Lacking this element, there is general agreement that mere negligence is not enough, even though it is so extreme in degree as to be characterized as “gross,” an unhappy term of ill-defined content, which occasionally, in a few jurisdictions, has been stretched to include the element of conscious indifference to consequences, and so to justify punitive damages.  Still less, of course, can such damages be charged against one who acts under an innocent mistake in engaging in conduct that nevertheless constitutes a tort. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 2, at 9–10 (footnotes omitted); see also Sales & Cole, supra note 3, at 1130–38 (discussing the various standards of conduct that warrant punitive damages).  5. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (“[Punitive damage awards] are not compensation for injury.  Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence.”).  Ohio Jury Instruction 23.71 states in part: “The purposes of punitive damages are to punish the offending party and to make the offending party an example to discourage others from similar conduct.”  1 OHIO JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 23.71 (2002).  But for an interesting analysis of why punishment and deterrence is not accomplished in the advent of insurance against punitive damage awards, see Sales & Cole, supra note 3, at 1163–64. 
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of the public “to protect and vindicate” its interests.6  Indeed, as early as 
1873, courts asked the following: 
How could the idea of punishment be deliberately and designedly installed as a doctrine of civil remedies?  Is not punishment out of place, . . . not to say absurd and ridiculous, when classed among civil remedies?  What kind of a civil remedy for the plaintiff is the punishment of the defendant?7 
These questions have since been debated frequently, yet inconclusively.8 
Perhaps the most compelling and remediable anomaly of the punitive 
damage concept is the apparent philosophical void between the rationale 
for punitive damages—deterrence and punishment—and the way punitive 
damages are distributed—as a windfall to the individual plaintiff.  Put 
differently, “If punitive damages are intended to convey the community’s 
condemnation of a defendant’s actions, then why should the money go to 
a single plaintiff instead of the community at large?”9  The Ohio 
Supreme Court’s recent attempt to address this seemingly inconsistent 
aspect of punitive damages has come under intense criticism.10 
 
 6. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 2, at 7.  7. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873); see also Bass v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 654, 672 (1877). It is difficult on principle to understand why, when the sufferer by a tort has been fully compensated for his suffering, he should recover anything more.  And it is equally difficult to understand why, if the tortfeasor is to be punished by exemplary damages, they should go to the compensated sufferer, and not to the public in whose behalf he is punished. 
Id. 
 8. See, e.g., L.S. (Bob) Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages: An Annotated 
Argumentative Outline, 11 FORUM 57, 58 (1975); James D. Ghiardi, The Case Against 
Punitive Damages, 8 FORUM 411 (1972); John Dwight Ingram, Punitive Damages 
Should Be Abolished, 17 CAP. U. L. REV. 205, 205–06 (1988); Sales & Cole, supra note 3, at 1164–65.  Perhaps the most compelling argument in support of the punitive damages doctrine was introduced by Angela P. Harris.  Harris argues that the conventional analysis that the law of tort is private and compensatory, whereas criminal law is public and punitive, is inherently flawed, and that punitive damages more properly represent the synergy of the private and public spheres.  Angela P. Harris, Rereading Punitive Damages: 
Beyond the Public/Private Distinction, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1079, 1079–82 (1989).  9. Scott Hiaasen, Court Took New Power with Split of Punitive Award, Critics 
Say Justices Can Now Aid Pet Causes, PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 5, 2003, at A1. 
 10. See Terry Carter, Parsing Punitives: Ohio Supreme Court Directs Part of 
Damage Award to Charity, 2 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 1, Jan. 10, 2003, at 2 (“It sounds like judicial tort reform.  They’re creating social policy or public policy and doing financial planning for the plaintiff.  It’s unprecedented, and it’s ex post facto, case by case.” (quoting Michael L. Rustad, Professor, Suffolk University Law School)); id. (“It is perhaps the greatest case of judicial lawmaking in the past two decades.  Such formulas are to be devised by legislatures, and the issue of using punitive damages to create this charity wasn’t even argued to the court.”  (quoting Victor Schwartz, a Washington, D.C.-
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In Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield,11 the Ohio Supreme 
Court reduced a $49 million punitive damage award to $30 million.12  
But as a condition of remittitur, the court ordered nearly $20 million of 
the award to be used to create a cancer research fund at Ohio State 
University.13  Many critics are up in arms over the decision, calling it 
“judicial activism at its height”14 and claiming that the court granted 
itself the power to aid pet causes.15 
This Casenote defends the judiciary’s right to award damages to third 
party beneficiaries without the expressed consent of the legislature, but 
recommends adjustments in the reallocation procedure.  Part II of this 
Casenote provides a brief glimpse of the history and current status of the 
punitive damages doctrine.  Part III introduces the facts and holding of 
the Dardinger case, and Part IV analyzes and addresses the implications 
of the decision.  Finally, Part V provides recommendations for a future 
course of action. 
II.  PUNITIVE DAMAGES: AN OVERVIEW 
The concept of punitive damages is not new.  The book of Exodus 
provides, “If a man shall steal an ox, or a sheep, and kill it, or sell it; he 
shall restore five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep.”16  One may 
 
based tort reform lawyer-lobbyist who argues that laws splitting punitive damages with states creates conflicts of interest for lawyers who will be more likely to settle if punitive damages are not available.  See generally Victor E. Schwartz et al., I’ll Take That: Legal 
and Public Policy Problems Raised by Statutes that Require Punitive Damage Awards to 
Be Shared with the State, 68 MO. L. REV. 525, 544–45 (2003)).  11. Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 781 N.E.2d 121 (Ohio 2002). 
 12. Id. at 145. 
 13. Id. at 146.  14. Adam Liptak, Court Orders Donation from Damages: Plaintiff in Dispute over 
Insurance Told to Give $20 Million, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 28, 2002, at 2 (quoting Robert Peck, Attorney, Ohio); see also supra note 10.  15. Hiaasen, supra note 9 (“It’s really a potentially dangerous decision.  The court has left itself to pick and choose how money won in the court should be spent.” (quoting Robert Strassfeld, Professor, Case Western Reserve University Law School)). 
 16. Exodus 22:1 (King James); see also Exodus 22:4 (“If the theft be certainly found in [the thief’s] hand alive, whether it be ox, or ass, or sheep; he shall restore double.”); Exodus 22:9. For all manner of trespass, whether it be for ox, for ass, for sheep, for raiment, 
or for any manner of lost thing, which another challengeth to be his, the cause of both parties shall come before the judges; and whom the judges shall condemn, he shall pay double unto his neighbour. 
Id.  The doctrine of punitive damages has been traced back to civilizations that predate the Bible.  The Code of Hammurabi, created as early as 2000 B.C., is thought to have been the first system to incorporate punitive damage awards.  1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 1.0, at 3 (2d ed. 1989) (noting the existence of multiple damages documented as early as 2000 B.C.).  Punitive damage awards were also permitted in the Hittite law in 1400 B.C. and in the Hindu Code of Manu in 200 B.C.  Id. § 1.1, at 3–4. 
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conclude from the castigatory nature of this provision that it was 
intended to punish and deter.17  These dual purposes remain the heart of 
the American punitive damages doctrine.18 
In 1784, the South Carolina Supreme Court decided Genay v. Norris,19 
the first reported American punitive damages case.  In Genay, the court 
permitted the jury to award vindictive damages to a plaintiff who had 
been injured when the defendant secretly spiked his drink.20  Where the 
defendant intentionally caused serious injury, the plaintiff was entitled to 
“very exemplary damages.”21  Seven years later, in Coryell v. Colbaugh,22 
the New Jersey Supreme Court identified the twin aims of punishment 
and deterrence when it awarded exemplary damages for the breach of a 
promise to marry.23  The jury was encouraged “not to estimate the 
damages by any particular proof of suffering or actual loss; but to give 
damages for example’s sake, to prevent such offenses in the future.”24 
These early cases demonstrate the judiciary’s willingness to act on its 
own accord to shape social policy.  By creating the punitive damages 
doctrine, courts and not legislators were forcing rational actors to 
reexamine the costs of wrongdoing.  These cases formed the foundation 
upon which the deeply rooted tradition of using civil damage awards to 
deter egregious conduct was forged.  But this foundation has not gone 
untested by harsh criticism and attempts to eradicate punitive damage 
awards from the courts’ arsenal.25 
 
 17. See Shores, supra note 4, at 63. 
 18. See JAMES D. GHIARDI & JOHN H. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.14 & n.1 (1999) (citing cases and statutes from thirty-six states and the District of Columbia acknowledging punishment and deterrence as the main objectives of the punitive damages doctrine).  19. 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6 (1784). 
 20. Id.  The plaintiff and defendant were quarreling and had agreed to settle their conflict with dueling pistols.  At the last moment, the defendant proposed that they set aside their differences and drink a reconciliation toast.  The defendant then slipped a large dose of cantharides into the plaintiff’s wine glass, causing the plaintiff excruciating pain.  Id. at 6–7. 
 21. Id. at 7.  22. 1 N.J.L. 77 (1791). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive 
Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 140 (1986) (suggesting that punitive damage awards may be unconstitutional); Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559, 559–69 (1992) (advocating the significant reduction of punitive damage awards through procedural hurdles); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of 
Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 
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The punitive damages doctrine has been heavily criticized during its 
lengthy tenure.26  Commentators have argued that punitive damage awards 
are premised on an “antibusiness bias”27 and jeopardize American 
industry,28 result in overdeterrence,29 increase insurance costs,30 and 
grant the jury inappropriate and unauthorized discretion.31  Others claim 
that punitive damage awards are unconstitutional violations of the 
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause,32 and of substantive and 
procedural due process.33  The Supreme Court, however, has consistently 
 
1298–1304 (1993); Sales & Cole, supra note 3, at 1154–64 (providing a rationale for abolishing punitive damages). 
 26. See supra note 8 (listing several commentators who advocate abolishing punitive damages).  27. Sales & Cole, supra note 3, at 1123. 
 28. Id. at 1154–56; see id. at 1154 (stating that the punitive damages doctrine “erodes the economic stability of society”). 
 29. See, e.g., John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on 
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 978– 79 (1984) (stating that ambiguity as to the appropriate legal standards for levying punitive damage awards results in overdeterrence); Ellis, supra note 3, at 988 (stating that unpredictability as to the potential size of punitive damage awards “induces overinvestment in liability avoidance, or worse, suppresses innovation”); see also Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The threat of such enormous awards has a detrimental effect on the research and development of new products.”).  30. Sales & Cole, supra note 3, at 1153–54 (stating that punitive damage awards are “a windfall to the plaintiff at the expense of innocent consumers who must pay increased premium rates for their insurance policies”).  31. This criticism dates back to 1861, when the court, in Pike v. Dilling, 48 Me. 539 (1861), questioned: Now, is there not a striking inconsistency and absurdity, in holding, that, while a traverse jury is not permitted in a criminal prosecution to determine the penalty to be inflicted on the delinquent for a public wrong, and the Court are restricted, by the Legislature, within certain limits, in the punishment it may inflict for such public wrong; yet it is prudent, wise and just to confer on the jury, in a civil prosecution for the private injury connected with the same 
public wrong, the unlimited power of inflicting upon the delinquent, in addition to full compensation for the private injury, such further punishment by way of public example, to deter others from committing similar wrongs, whatever pecuniary mulct the jury, in their uncontrolled caprice, may see fit to give . . . ? 
Id. at 541.  32. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“[E]xcessive fines [shall not be] imposed.”).  In 
Browning-Ferris, the Supreme Court decided in a limited holding that punitive damage awards between private parties in civil lawsuits were not subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.  492 U.S. at 275–76.  The Court explained that “the primary focus of the Eighth Amendment was the potential for governmental abuse of its ‘prosecutorial’ power, not concern with the extent or purposes of civil damages.”  Id. at 266; see discussion infra Part IV.C (analyzing whether allocation to a state entity would violate the Excessive Fines Clause). 
 33. See Ellis, supra note 3, at 990 (“[The] process for imposing a punitive damage sanction is so lacking in fundamental fairness as to deny defendants . . . the due process guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments.”).  But see Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 17 (1991) (“[W]e cannot say that the common-law method for 
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upheld the constitutionality of the punitive damages doctrine,34 and the 
dual objectives of punishment and deterrence continue to be the basis 
upon which forty-six states and the District of Columbia authorize 
punitive damage awards as a function of common law.35 
This Casenote accepts the necessity of punitive damage awards to 
deter wrongdoing and limits its analysis to the question of how states 
should address the issue of distribution so as to mitigate the “windfall 
effect”36 of punitive damage awards.  Using the Ohio Supreme Court’s 
decision as a jump-off, the remainder of this Casenote concentrates on 
the means by which states can develop congruency between the purposes 
of punitive damage awards and the ways in which they are distributed. 
III.  THE DARDINGER DECISION 
Robert Dardinger received Anthem’s letter denying his wife lifesaving 
treatment on November 11, 1997, the day after her funeral.37  This final 
insult capped six months of “frustration, doubt, and desperation” caused 
by Anthem’s “practiced powerlessness, their active inactivity.”38   
In October 1996, plaintiff Robert Dardinger’s wife, Esther, was 
diagnosed with metastatic brain tumors.39  In April 1997, upon the 
recommendation of her doctor and the Ohio State University Neuro-
Oncology Tumor Board, Esther began intra-arterial chemotherapy (IAC) 
 
assessing punitive damages is so inherently unfair as to deny due process and be per se unconstitutional.”).  The Court explained that jury instructions which place “reasonable constraints” on the jury, “meaningful and adequate” post-trial procedures for trial court review of the award, and appellate review protects defendants from awards that are “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the offense.”  Id. at 2. 
 34. See Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 275–76 (holding that punitive damage awards in civil lawsuits do not violate the Excessive Fines Clause); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. 
Co., 499 U.S. at 17 (holding that punitive damages do not violate the Due Process Clause). 
 35. See GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 18, tbl. 4.1.  Only Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington prohibit the recovery of punitive damages under the common law.  See, e.g., McCoy v. Ark. Natural Gas Co., 143 So. 383, 384–86 (La. 1932); City of Lowell v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 47 N.E.2d 265, 272 (Mass. 1943); Abel v. Conover, 104 N.W.2d 684, 688 (Neb. 1960); Kammerer v. W. Gear Corp., 635 P.2d 708, 711 (Wash. 1981).  36. Punitive damage awards have long been considered a windfall for plaintiffs.  
See Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873); Breslo, supra note 3, at 1133 (arguing that “punitive damage awards amount to a windfall for plaintiffs”); Sales & Cole, supra note 3, at 1158–60.  37. Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 781 N.E.2d 121, 130 (Ohio 2002). 
 38. Id. at 140. 
 39. Id. at 124. 
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treatment to shrink the tumors.40  Anthem, Esther’s medical insurance 
carrier, approved the twelve-treatment program.41  The tumors had shrunk 
significantly after only two treatments, and Esther did not manifest any 
side effects.42 
The Dardingers’ nightmare began after Esther’s third IAC treatment, 
when Anthem informed them that they would no longer pay for her 
treatments.43  The Dardingers appealed immediately.44  On July 24, 
Anthem revived the Dardingers’ hopes by informing them that Esther’s 
treatments had been approved.45  Three weeks later, Anthem snatched 
hope away,46 claiming they had erred and that the treatments were not in 
fact approved.47   
On August 5, the Dardingers submitted their second appeal, which 
delayed Esther’s scheduled IAC treatment.48  Days and weeks slipped by 
as Anthem offered a litany of reasons for the denial of Esther’s claim: 
the treatment was too experimental, it should have been an outpatient 
procedure, the therapy was not “recognized as safe and effective for the 
treatment of metastatic brain cancer” (despite the MRI results showing 
significant reduction of the tumors).49  When asked about the appeal 
status, Anthem responded that they had 120 days to resolve the appeal 
and displayed no sense of urgency.50  But an Anthem internal e-mail 
entitled, “URGENT: Esther Dardinger,” showed their clear understanding 
of the gravity of the situation and instructed Anthem employees: “DO 
NOT discuss details of the info in the following messages, only that it is 
in review . . . .  This could/probably will end up in a suit.”51  In a separate 
e-mail, an Anthem employee acknowledged that Anthem’s bureaucratic 
intransigence had created a “sad and embarrassing situation.”52   
On September 17, worried about the cost of IAC treatments (which 
could have exceeded $100,000) and unable to wait out Anthem’s appeal 
 
 40. Id.  “IAC delivers chemotherapy to brain tumors by means of an arterial catheter threaded through whichever artery is feeding the area of the brain where the tumor is located and into the brain.”  Id. at 124–25.  This allows doctors to administer a much higher dose of chemotherapy specifically to the affected area without subjecting other organs to the lethal toxicity of the drugs.  Id. at 125. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 126. 
 46. Id. at 140. 
 47. Id. at 126. 
 48. Id. at 127. 
 49. Id. at 125–26, 129. 
 50. Id. at 127. 
 51. Id. at 128. 
 52. Id. at 129. 
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process, Esther underwent intravenous chemotherapy.53  The sweeping 
toxicity of the chemotherapy “burned out her bone marrow,” and Esther 
never recovered.54  Justice Pfeifer, writing for the majority, summarized 
Anthem’s actions: 
Anthem had worn them down as surely as the cancer had.  Like the cancer, Anthem relentlessly followed its own course, uncaring, oblivious to what it destroyed, seeking only to have its way.  The ruination of a life was just a side effect.  . . . “[T]he jury could easily find that a pervasive corporate attitude existed with the defendants to place profit over patients” and . . . “the defendants disregarded the rights of their insured[s] in an effort to obtain higher profits.”55 
On April 22, 1998, Robert Dardinger sued Anthem for breach of 
contract, bad faith, and punitive damages.56  At trial, the jury returned a 
verdict awarding Dardinger $1350 for the breach of contract claim, $2.5 
million in compensatory damages for the bad faith claim, and $49 
million in punitive damages.57   
The Ohio Supreme Court granted certiorari to “address the issue of 
whether [the punitive damage] award was ‘grossly excessive’ and thus 
violated the federal Due Process Clause, whether it was excessive under 
Ohio law, and whether remittitur is appropriate.”58  First, the court 
applied the factors enunciated in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore59 
 
 53. Id. at 127. 
 54. Id. at 127–28. 
 55. Id. at 142 (quoting trial court).  56. Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Nos. 99-CA-127, 99-CA-136, 2001 WL 575129, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 22, 2001), rev’d, Dardinger, 781 N.E.2d 121.  Dardinger also alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful death claims, which were dismissed prior to jury deliberation.  Id.  It is a miracle that the Dardingers were able to bring this case.  Most health plans offered by employers are governed by a federal law that bans most damage awards.  An exemption to the current law allows lawsuits by employees of churches and public agencies.  Because Dardinger got his insurance through his work as a schoolteacher, he was able to sue Anthem and ask for punitive damages. 
 57. Dardinger, 781 N.E.2d at 134. 
 58. Id. at 140.  The court was also asked to determine whether Anthem had waived its possible contract defense to Dardinger’s claim.  Id. at 135.  The Dardingers’ insurance carrier was Community Insurance Company, which did business under the name Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield.  Id. at 124.  Community Insurance Group was the wholly owned subsidiary of Anthem Insurance Companies, Inc.  Id.  The court refused Anthem’s attempts to distinguish the separate entities and avoid greater liability.  Id. at 136–40.  59. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).  The three guideposts set out by the Court in the BMW case are the following: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, (2) the ratio of the punitive damage award to the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff, and 
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and found that the jury’s $49 million punitive damage judgment “was 
not grossly excessive under the federal Constitution and did not violate 
[Anthem’s] due process rights.”60  Nevertheless, the court found that 
“the punitive damages award in this case was excessive under Ohio 
law.”61  It noted that the largest punitive damage award previously 
allowed by the court was $15 million.62  While acknowledging that 
Anthem deserved a “historic punitive damages award,”63 the court was 
hesitant to approve an award that would “create its own overriding 
problems.”64  In a somewhat conclusory manner, the court determined 
that doubling the previous highest punitive award would have been 
appropriate under Ohio law, but tripling the award violated the Ohio 
Constitution.65  Finally, the court addressed the issue of remittitur, and 
held: “We are imposing a remittitur of $19 million, so that the total 
punitive damages award is $30 million.  We also have another 
condition.”66  It is this additional condition which has become the focus 
of much controversy.67 
In ordering the conditional remittal of the $49 million jury award, 
the court attempted to bridge the philosophical void between the 
objectives and application of the punitive damages doctrine.68  The 
court ordered that the jury’s award be reduced to $30 million plus 
postjudgment interest, which was thought to be around $9 million in 
this case.69  From that corpus of approximately $39 million, the court 
and attorneys’ fees would be extracted.70  The court ruled: “The 
amount of attorney fees should be determined by the contract between 
Dardinger and his attorney, and should be based upon the amount 
originally in the corpus, $30 million plus statutory interest.”71  
Dardinger would receive $10 million.72  The court held that the 
 
(3) comparable criminal penalties for comparable misconduct.  Id. at 575–85. 
 60. Dardinger, 781 N.E.2d at 140, 143. 
 61. Id. at 144. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 144–45. 
 66. Id. at 145 (emphasis added). 
 67. See Carter, supra note 10.  68. In referring to this philosophical void, the court sardonically noted: “The community makes the statement, while the plaintiff reaps the monetary award.”  Dardinger, 781 N.E.2d at 145. 
 69. Id. at 146; Darrel Rowland, Verdict Restored; Insurer Chastised, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 21, 2002, at A1 (noting that postjudgment interest would be in the neighborhood of $9 million). 
 70. Dardinger, 781 N.E.2d at 146. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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remaining amount, somewhere between $17 to 20 million,73 
should go to a place that will achieve a societal good, a good that can rationally offset the harm done by the defendants in this case.  Due to the societal stake in the punitive damages award, we find it most appropriate that it go to a state institution.  In this case we order that the corpus of the punitive damages award go to a cancer research fund, to be called the Esther Dardinger Fund, at the James Cancer Hospital and Solove Research Institute at the Ohio State University.74 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The Ohio Supreme Court justified its reallocation of the punitive 
damages award by noting: “At the punitive-damages level, it is the 
societal element that is most important.  The plaintiff remains a party, 
but the de facto party is our society, and the jury is determining whether 
and to what extent we as a society should punish the defendant.”75  Thus, 
it follows that society, as the de facto party, should receive the benefit of 
the punitive damage award.  This concept is not novel.  In fact, since 
1985 twelve states have enacted split-recovery statutes.76  Such “split-
recovery statutes” allocate a portion of the punitive damages award to 
 
 73. If we assume a 30% contingency fee, the attorneys would be entitled to $11.7 million.  Dardinger would take his $10 million, leaving $300,000 to cover the court costs of extended litigation; this would leave $17 million for allocation to the Esther Dardinger Cancer Research Fund.  Id. at 146. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 145.  76. The twelve states that enacted split-recovery statutes are Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Iowa, New York, Oregon, and Utah.  But the statutes were repealed in Colorado, Florida, Kansas, and New York.  Act of May 9, 1997, ch. 26, § 10, 1 Alaska Sess. Laws 8 (codified by ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (Michie 2002)); Act of May 16, 1986, ch. 106, § 1, 1986 Colo. Sess. Laws 675 (repealed by Act of March 9, 1995, ch. 6, § 1, 1995 Colo. Sess. Laws 14); Act of June 26, 1986, ch. 160, § 52, 1986 Fla. Laws 749 (repealed 1997); Tort Reform Act of 1987, No. 672, 1987 Ga. Laws 915 (codified as amended at GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (Supp. 2000)); Public Act 84-1431, Art. 3, § 1, 1986 Ill. Laws 3740 (codified by 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1207 (West Supp. 2003)); Act of March 6, 1998, § 47, 1998 Ind. Acts 317 (codified at IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-6 (Michie 1998)); Act of May 22, 1986, ch. 1211, § 42, 1986 Iowa Acts 313 (codified as amended at IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1 (West 1998)); Act of April 26, 1985, ch. 197, § 2(e), 1985 Kan. Sess. Laws 951, 953 (repealed 1988); 1996 Mo. Laws 869 § C (codified by MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.675 (West Supp. 2000)); Act of April 10, 1992, ch. 55, § 393, 1992 N.Y. Laws 162 (also set April 1, 1994 as date of repeal, Act of April 10, 1992, ch. 55, § 427(dd), 1992 N.Y. Laws 162); Act of July 17, 1987, ch. 774, § 3, 1987 Or. Laws 1570 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540 (2001)); An Act Relating to Punitive Damages, ch. 237, § 1, 1989 Utah Laws 717 (codified by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (Supp. 2002)). 
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the state in an attempt to allay the windfall effect.77  But much to the 
chagrin of several commentators, Ohio became the first state to order 
such an allocation by judicial decree.78  Critics argue that the Dardinger 
decision is (1) an unprecedented legislative power grab, (2) a judicial 
grant to aid their own pet causes, (3) an excessive fine in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment,79 (4) a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
and Due Process Clauses, and (5) “fraught with unintended and 
undesirable consequences,”80 such as robbing plaintiffs of incentive to 
prosecute their suits and increasing already mammoth punitive damage 
awards.81  The remainder of this Casenote analyzes these criticisms and 
offers recommendations for improving punitive damage distribution. 
A.  Separation of Powers 
Chief Justice Moyer’s dissent in Dardinger argued that “the legislative 
branch is better equipped to establish a uniform mechanism for 
alternative distribution.”82  Moyer’s concern centered on the lack of 
“standards or guidelines” available to courts charged with the task of 
distributing punitive damage awards.83  Exactly what constitutes a 
legislative issue, as opposed to a judicial issue, is a debate that has raged 
since the 1700s.  For instance, in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. 
Wilderness Society,84 the United States Supreme Court addressed the 
issue of whether a court, as opposed to Congress and in the absence of 
directive legislation, could direct a party to pay its opponents’ attorneys’ 
fees.85  The Court held that only Congress, and not the courts, could 
authorize an exception to the general “American rule” that attorney fees 
are not ordinarily recoverable by a prevailing litigant in the absence of 
 
 77. See, e.g., Charles F.G. Parkinson, Note, A Shift in the Windfall: An Analysis of 
Indiana’s Punitive Damages Allocation Statute and the Recovery of Attorney’s Fees 
Under the Particular Services Clause, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 923, 943–44 (1998) (describing split-recovery statutes).  78. Lee Leonard, Ruling Highlights Court’s Split: Punitive Damages Given to New 
Fund, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 3, 2003, at C1 (“As far as I can tell, there is no other state Supreme Court in the country that has awarded punitive damages in this fashion.”   (quoting Richard Mason, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers)).  79. While the Supreme Court has not specifically ruled whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to the states, most commentators agree that, like the other provisions of the Eighth Amendment, it would.  See James D. Ghiardi, Punitive 
Damages: State Extraction Practice Is Subject to Eighth Amendment Limitations, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 119, 125 n.57 (1990) (arguing that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to the states); Jeffries, supra note 25, at 148 (same). 
 80. Dardinger, 781 N.E.2d at 147 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting). 
 81. See discussion infra Part IV.A–E. 
 82. Dardinger, 781 N.E.2d at 148. 
 83. Id. at 147.  84. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
 85. Id. at 241. 
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statutory authorization.86  But in reaching that conclusion, the Court 
relied almost solely on the fact that Congress had always considered fee 
awards within their province.87  Specifically, it held the following: 
Since the approach taken by Congress to this issue has been to carve out specific exceptions to a general rule that federal courts cannot award attorneys’ fees beyond the limits of [statutory authority], those courts are not free to fashion drastic new rules with respect to the allowance of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party . . . .88 
In contrast, punitive damages arose from the common law in forty-six 
states, and only eight states modify punitive damage awards through 
split-recovery statutes.89  Justice Pfeifer, writing for the majority in 
Dardinger, relied heavily on this point to provide the court with the 
authority to divert the punitive damage award: “In Ohio, punitive 
damages are an outgrowth of the common law.  Therefore, Ohio’s courts 
have a central role to play in the distribution of punitive damages.”90  
Indeed, as one commentator notes: “Broad power to shape and effectuate 
remedies is deeply rooted in the common law system.  For centuries, 
courts have prescribed remedies requiring continuing supervision of 
various enterprises; thus, there is nothing new in the notion that courts 
have such authority.”91   
Not only do courts have the authority to shape remedies, but they also 
are often better suited to do so than the legislature.  In the words of 
Justice Pfeifer: “It’s humanly impossible for the legislature to sit down 
and imagine all the permutations.  The courts, on a case-by-case basis, 
are equipped to handle these things.”92  Judges enjoy a unique perspective 
that neither the legislature nor the jury can appreciate.  The legislature 
can only paint with broad strokes the landscape of tort reparations; the 
jury is only privy to the individualized details of the case before them.  
But judges can decipher the fine detail of individual circumstances 
within the bigger picture.  Judges are acutely aware of what tort reformers 
refer to as the “tort crisis,” and yet are also in tune with the particular 
 
 86. Id. at 269–71. 
 87. Id. at 247–48 (citing the Federal Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 35, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73). 
 88. Id. at 269. 
 89. See supra note 76.  90. Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 781 N.E.2d 121, 145–46 (Ohio 2002) (citations omitted).  91. Shores, supra note 4, at 91 (footnote omitted).  92. Leonard, supra note 78, at C1. 
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harms involved in the cases before them.  It is for this reason that Justice 
Pfeifer held: “Punitive damages awards should not be subject to bright-
line division but instead should be considered on a case-by-case basis, 
with those awards making the most significant societal statements being 
the most likely candidates for alternative distribution.”93 
In Dardinger, the court had the opportunity to make a sizable 
allocation for public benefit without infringing upon Dardinger’s incentive 
to prosecute the suit.  But imagine if the jury had awarded a significantly 
smaller figure, say $1 million in punitive damages.  Dardinger’s attorneys 
still would have been entitled to extract their contingency fee for their 
efforts to eradicate a social malfeasant, but what then of the paltry 
remainder?  To split the award in the same proportion as in the actual 
case would so dilute the benefit to the public that it would not likely 
offset the chilling of Dardinger’s incentive to prosecute the suit through 
trial.  Certainly, under such circumstances, it would hardly seem worth 
Dardinger’s investment in prosecuting the case.  It is well recognized 
that punitive damage awards, in addition to punishing defendants and 
deterring future wrongdoing, also reward plaintiffs’ courage in prosecuting 
claims through to trial.  Allocating a portion of the award to the plaintiff 
is necessary to ensure that plaintiffs will continue to bring punitive 
damages claims because plaintiffs’ time and energy must be compensated 
to make pursuing the cases worthwhile.94  Indeed, every state that has 
enacted a split-recovery statute has recognized this and allocated a 
portion of the award to the plaintiff.95   
By avoiding legislatively mandated allocations and looking instead at 
the totality of the circumstances, courts are able to present plaintiffs, as 
well as attorneys, with rewards for their courage and diligence.  In this 
manner, courts are able to assess the efforts of the plaintiff to combat 
social iniquities, appraise the potential public benefit of redistributing 
the punitive damages award, and order an allocation of the award that 
will both benefit the public and guarantee the plaintiff’s incentive to 
pursue such claims.  The lack of predetermined legislative guidelines 
that concerned Chief Justice Moyer are in fact exactly what make courts 
better equipped to redistribute punitive damage awards. 
 
 93. Dardinger, 781 N.E.2d at 146; see also Shores, supra note 4, at 92–93 (arguing that judges should determine an allocation that will best serve the public policy purposes of the punitive damages doctrine). 
 94. See Dede W. Welles, Note, Charitable Punishment: A Proposal to Award Punitive 
Damages to Nonprofit Organizations, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 203, 207–08 (1998). 
 95. See supra note 76. 
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B. Judicial Discretion 
Chief Justice Moyer further criticized the majority’s decision by 
saying it “sanctions a judge’s unbridled discretion to allocate punitive 
damages to his or her preferred charity.”96  While acting sua sponte in 
ordering that the punitive damage award benefit the Ohio State 
University cancer research institute, the majority never directly confronted 
the issue of who should determine where the distribution would best 
serve the public’s interest.  In fact, the opinion reads, “Plaintiffs themselves 
might get involved in how the award is distributed.”97  But it is unclear 
how the court would have plaintiffs go about this.  Dardinger had set up 
four charitable trusts, at least one of which was to benefit the cancer 
hospital, but never had the opportunity to express his opinion as to 
where the money would best serve the public’s interest.98   
While some commentators argue that judges are in the best position to 
pick the most worthwhile cause because they “see community problems 
in their court rooms on a daily basis [and] can decide what areas of the 
populace are most deserving,”99 others articulate concern over granting 
them such power.  One commentator, arguing that plaintiffs and not 
judges should determine where the funds should be allocated, points out 
that “[j]udges, like other prominent members of society, often sit on the 
boards of nonprofit organizations.  Given the power to allocate money to 
the organization of their choice, they might be tempted to award it to a 
pet charity which would not otherwise be a natural beneficiary.”100  
Nevertheless, even this commentator concedes that this alone is not 
grounds for taking distribution authority away from the judge and is a 
problem that can be remedied through adherence to the ethical code that 
all judges are bound by.101  The more compelling argument is that such 
involvement by the court may constitute state action and invoke the 
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. 
 
 96. Dardinger, 781 N.E.2d at 147 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting). 
 97. Id. at 146.  98. Leonard, supra note 78.  Dardinger did express satisfaction with the court’s decision, but he also noted that he probably would have allocated some of the money to benefit those fighting cancer as well as for cancer research.  Liptak, supra note 14. 
 99. See, e.g., Laura Ritchie et al., Today’s Problems/Tomorrow’s Lawyers: Redirecting 
Punitive Damages, RECORDER, May 5, 1993, at 8. 
 100. See Welles, supra note 94, at 207 (footnotes omitted). 
 101. See id. at 207, 218 n.98. 
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C.  The Eighth Amendment 
In the past, punitive damages have been challenged as excessive fines 
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.102  The U.S. Supreme Court rejected 
that argument where the state was a mere arbiter in civil cases between 
private parties.103  In Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, 
Inc., the Court began its analysis by focusing on the definition of the 
word “fine” and looking to the history and purpose of the Eighth 
Amendment.104  It found that the Eighth Amendment, and more 
specifically the Excessive Fines Clause, was designed to curb potential 
“governmental abuse of ‘prosecutorial’ power,” and was “not 
concern[ed] with the extent or purposes of civil damages.”105  After 
interpreting this to be the Framers’ intent, the Court concluded that the 
Excessive Fines Clause could not be triggered “where a private party 
receives exemplary damages from another party, and the government has 
no share in the recovery,” because concern for government abuse is 
nonexistent.106  The Court, however, explicitly left open the question of 
whether the Excessive Fines Clause would apply to punitive damages if 
the government had prosecuted the action or stood to profit from a share 
of the levied damages award.107   
The Dardinger decision arguably triggers the application of the Eighth 
Amendment for two reasons.  First, granting a portion of the award to a state 
institution—Ohio State University’s cancer research institute—makes 
the state a beneficiary to the award and reinstates concerns that 
government will abuse its prosecutorial powers for its own gain.  
Second, judicial determination of where the damage award is to be 
distributed may constitute state action, inviting the application of the 
Excessive Fines Clause. 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Browning-Ferris appears to have 
imposed two requirements that must be met in order to trigger the 
 
 102. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989). 
 103. Id. at 260. 
 104. Id. at 264–66. 
 105. Id. at 266.  “[T]he text of the Amendment suggests an intention to limit the power of those entrusted with the criminal-law function of government.”  Id. at 263. We think it clear, from both the language of the Excessive Fines Clause and the nature of our constitutional framework, that the Eighth Amendment places limits on the steps a government may take against an individual, whether it be keeping him in prison, imposing excessive monetary sanctions, or using cruel and unusual punishments.  The fact that punitive damages are imposed through the aegis of courts and serve to advance governmental interests is insufficient to support the step petitioners ask us to take. 
Id. at 275. 
 106. Id. at 272. 
 107. Id. at 264, 275 n.21. 
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Excessive Fines Clause.  The Court held that “the Excessive Fines 
Clause was intended to limit only those fines directly imposed by, and 
payable to, the government.”108  The word “and” creates ambiguity as to 
whether granting a portion of punitive damage awards to the state, even 
when the action was prosecuted by a private citizen, triggers the 
Excessive Fines Clause.  In Browning-Ferris, the Court noted that the 
government had not “taken a positive step to punish,” nor had it “used 
the civil courts to extract large payments or forfeitures for the purpose of 
raising revenue or disabling some individual.”109  Many commentators 
have understood this to mean that punitive damage awards which benefit 
the state—through judicial allocation or split-recovery statutes—would 
invoke the Excessive Fines Clause.110  Indeed, Justice O’Connor’s 
dissent in Browning-Ferris reached this conclusion, raising the concern 
that the Court’s ruling would clearly implicate problems for states that 
had adopted split-recovery statutes.111  But this understanding seems to 
read past the critical word “and” in the Browning-Ferris holding.  While 
damage awards may be payable to the state in the split-allocation 
context, they are not “imposed by” the state.  The state neither prosecutes 
nor initiates the civil punitive damages action; it merely referees it.  
Several states have relied on this distinction in upholding split-recovery 
statutes.112  Thus, it is still unclear as to whether distribution to a state 
entity alone will invoke the Excessive Fines Clause, but as Part V of this 
Casenote suggests, it may be unnecessary to reach a conclusion on this 
sticky issue. 
As for the question of whether granting the judiciary the power to 
determine where the punitive damage award should be allocated, it is 
doubtful that this involvement alone would invoke application of the 
Excessive Fines Clause.  As noted above, the Excessive Fines Clause was 
 
 108. Id. at 268 (emphasis added). 
 109. Id. at 275.  
 110. See Ghiardi, supra note 79, at 125 n.57; Jeffries, supra note 25, at 148. 
 111. Id. at 298–99 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[B]y relying so heavily on the distinction between governmental involvement and purely private suits, the Court suggests (despite its claim . . . that it leaves the question open) that the Excessive Fines Clause will place some limits on awards of punitive damages that are recovered by a governmental entity.”). 
 112. See, e.g., Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 868 (Iowa 1994) (finding the Excessive Fines Clause inapplicable to the Iowa split-recovery statute because the state did not prosecute the action); Tenold v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 873 P.2d 413, 424 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (holding the Excessive Fines Clause inapplicable because “[t]he government of Oregon did not initiate [the] action”). 
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designed to curb government abuse.113  Allocating the jury-determined 
award poses no threat of unjust or excessive punishment.  Further, were 
a court to distribute the award to a nonstate-run institution, such as a 
private nonprofit organization, none of the concerns identified by the 
Court in Browning-Ferris would be present.  It therefore appears that 
application of the Excessive Fines Clause could only be a potential 
problem if states were to allocate punitive damage awards to state 
institutions. 
D.  The Fifth Amendment 
The Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from taking private 
property for public use without just compensation.114  Thus, assessing 
when plaintiffs take ownership over punitive damage awards, if ever, is 
the necessary first step in analyzing whether judicial allocation of 
punitive damage awards violates the Takings Clause.  Unlike compensatory 
damages, plaintiffs do not have a right to punitive damages.115  Whereas 
plaintiffs accrue rights to compensatory damages—via the right of 
redress—after demonstrating actual injury, they have no right to a 
punitive damage award until an award judgment has been entered.116 
In Dardinger, the court was careful to assign the plaintiff property 
rights only in the $10 million it intended to allocate for him.117  The 
court specifically conditioned the remittitur on Dardinger’s acceptance 
of the allocation the court devised, making it clear that the interests of 
the cancer research institute and Dardinger vested simultaneously.118  By 
doing so, the court protected itself against a Takings Clause challenge by 
ensuring that Dardinger never attained property rights in the portion of 
the award that was allocated elsewhere.  So long as courts carefully 
elucidate that recipients’ property interests arise simultaneously, split-
allocation of punitive damage awards does not violate the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause. 
Further, redistributing punitive damages awards does not violate the 
Due Process Clause.  In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, the 
 
 113. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.  114. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  115. Shores, supra note 4, at 90 (“Courts have uniformly held that the plaintiff has no personal right to punitive damages.”). 
 116. See Paul F. Kirgis, Note, The Constitutionality of State Allocation of Punitive 
Damage Awards, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 843, 850–51 (1993).  117. Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 781 N.E.2d 121, 146 (Ohio 2002) (“[S]hould Dardinger accept this court’s remittitur[,] . . . $10 million should go to Dardinger.  From the remainder should be drawn an amount for the payment of litigation fees, including attorney fees. . . .  The final net amount . . . should go to a place that will achieve a societal good . . . .”). 
 118. Id. 
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Supreme Court held that punitive damage awards did not violate the Due 
Process Clause per se.119  There is nothing about distributing punitive 
damage awards to third party beneficiaries or state entities that would 
renew this debate.  This point is well articulated by Alabama’s Justice 
Janie Shores: 
The plaintiff has no basis for complaint if the trial judge orders the defendant to pay part or all of a punitive damage award to either the state treasury or some other fund, because the plaintiff has no constitutional right to punitive damages.  The defendant has no basis for complaint, because the right to trial by jury is not diminished by a post-trial directive from the court to pay a part of the jury verdict to one other than the plaintiff.  The defendant is not entitled to a return of any amount of the verdict once a jury has determined the issue of liability and has fixed the amount appropriate to punish the defendant for his actions and to deter the defendant and others from similar conduct in the future.  Due process rights are thus not implicated by a directive from the trial court to the defendant to deposit a portion of the amount with the clerk of the court for such disposition as the court may order, consistent with the administration of justice.120 
E.  The Alleged Undesirable Consequences 
The most significant of the possible “unintended and undesirable 
consequences” that the Dardinger dissenters may have been referring to 
are (1) the potential loss of incentive for plaintiffs and their attorneys to 
prosecute their claim through the trial process, and (2) the possibility 
that juries, knowing that funds will be diverted to the public sector, will 
unfairly increase punitive damage awards.121   
While punishment and deterrence are the most frequently cited 
justifications for punitive damages, courts and legislators would be remiss 
to ignore the importance of providing tort victims an incentive to pursue 
their claims.  Without a reward for the courage and endurance plaintiffs 
exhibit in prosecuting social wrongs, the “emotional and financial stress” 
of suing may discourage many tort victims from bringing suit or from 
rejecting premature settlement offers.122  Punitive damages are necessary 
to deter the types of egregious conduct that harm society and violate 
 
 119. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 17 (1991) (“[W]e cannot say that the common-law method for assessing punitive damages is so inherently unfair as to deny due process and be per se unconstitutional.”).  120. Shores, supra note 4, at 91 (footnotes omitted). 
 121. Dardinger, 781 N.E.2d at 147 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).  122. See Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive 
Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 KY. L.J. 1, 75 (1985–86). 
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social norms but cannot be remedied by the criminal justice system.  The 
fear of paying compensatory damages alone will not deter defendants 
who stand to profit from contemptuous behavior.123   
In Dardinger, the Ohio court properly safeguarded its decision by 
ensuring that plaintiffs and their attorneys retained incentive to bring 
suits that would benefit the public interest. 
Clearly, we do not want to dissuade plaintiffs from moving forward with important societal undertakings.  The distribution of the jury’s award must recognize the effort the plaintiff undertook in bringing about the award and the important role a plaintiff plays in bringing about necessary changes that society agrees need be made.  Plaintiffs themselves might get involved in how the award is distributed.124 
The court went on to reward Dardinger’s efforts with one-third of the 
punitive damage award and ensure that Dardinger’s attorney received his 
contractually agreed upon contingency fee in its entirety.125   
 In addition to the monetary recognition of plaintiffs’ efforts, allocating 
a portion of the punitive damage award may help to recast the perception 
of plaintiffs as greedy wealth seekers to agents acting for the public 
good.126  This public recognition of plaintiffs as model citizens, however, 
could have dire consequences for defendants.  Some commentators argue 
that juries will award astronomical punitive damage awards once they 
are made aware that such funds benefit the public sector.127  But this 
argument ignores the safeguards already instituted to protect against 
excessive punitive damage awards.  Defendants who believe they have 
been victimized by such awards may petition the court for reduction.  
Courts are empowered to order remittitur any time “(1) unliquidated 
damages are assessed by a jury, (2) the verdict is not influenced by 
 
 123. Unlike compensatory damages, punitive damages are unpredictable and unlimited.  Thus, rational actors will not be able to view the possibility of punitive fines as a mere business expense.  See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 25, at 1276 (arguing that awarding punitive damages is a necessary remedy against the abuse of power by economic elites); Welles, supra note 94, at 208.  But readers should be aware that many states permit liability insurance.  Liability insurance allows defendants to avoid the punishment and deterrent effects of punitive damage awards by shifting the consequences to a third party insurer.  See Sales & Cole, supra note 3, at 1162–64.  In the eyes of many, including the Author, liability insurance is inapposite to the goals of the American tort system and should be abolished. 
 124. Dardinger, 781 N.E.2d at 146. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Welles, supra note 94, at 211. 
 127. See id. at 212 (“Most commentators agree that if jurors are notified of the distribution, they will increase the size of the award.”).  But not all commentators believe that increased punitive damage awards would be detrimental.  See E. Jeffrey Grube, Note, Punitive Damages: A Misplaced Remedy, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 839, 850 (1993) (arguing that juries award insufficient punitive damages as a way of counteracting the plaintiff’s windfall effect). 
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passion or prejudice, (3) the award is excessive, and (4) the plaintiff 
agrees to the reduction in damages.”128  Thus, courts, which are deemed to 
be above impassioned exuberance, have the ultimate power to determine 
the appropriateness of punitive damage awards, alleviating any concern 
that public sentiment will lead to increased punitive damage awards. 
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Courts, and not legislators, should take the initiative in distributing 
punitive damage awards to the public sector.  Legislators lack the agility 
necessary to equitably distribute punitive damage awards in the myriad 
situations that will arise before courts.  Where punishment and deterrence 
are necessary, but the plaintiff is not worthy,129 courts have the flexibility to 
more equitably distribute damage awards so as to disperse the benefits to 
the public.  Courts should not be forced by legislative mandate to distribute 
a set portion of an award to an undeserving plaintiff, but should have the 
opportunity of rewarding particularly courageous ones.  Indeed, Robert 
Dardinger was such a plaintiff.  From its broader perspective, the 
judiciary is better equipped to combat social iniquities, appraise the 
potential benefits of redistributing punitive damage awards, and order 
the allocation of awards that will both benefit the public and ensure that 
the twin aims of punishment and deterrence are upheld. 
The allocation of punitive damage awards to state entities may trigger the 
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.130  While the application 
of the Excessive Fines Clause to allocations of punitive damage awards 
to state institutions does not automatically render them unconstitutional, 
it does entitle defendants to a review for excessiveness.131  Litigating 
under the rubric of the Excessive Fines Clause, however, is unnecessary 
if courts allocate punitive damage awards to nonstate entities.  The 
Supreme Court has made clear that the Excessive Fines Clause does not 
apply where “the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has 
any right to receive a share of the damages awarded.”132  Thus, courts 
should avoid the burden of defending constitutional challenges to 
 
 128. Dardinger, 781 N.E.2d at 145. 
 129. See, e.g., Welles, supra note 94, at 203 (discussing a situation in which an unsympathetic plaintiff only received $50,000 in compensatory damages but profited from a $7 million punitive damage award). 
 130. See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
 131. See Welles, supra note 94, at 209.  132. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 264 (1989). 
MARTIN.DOC 9/24/2019  4:19 PM 
 
1670 
allocations of punitive damage awards by distributing portions of such 
awards to private nonprofit organizations.133   
In addition to avoiding application of the Excessive Fines Clause, the 
distribution of punitive damage awards to nonprofit organizations that 
are bound by fiduciary duties to act within the bounds of their mission 
statements ensures that the benefits of the awards are not wasted on 
bureaucratic lethargy or largess.  Instead, monies received from punitive 
damage awards will be concentrated on eradicating the particular harms 
caused by the defendants or assisting those who have been victimized by 
similar conduct.  Further, awards could be distributed specifically within 
the communities affected by the defendants’ conduct so as to benefit 
those most adversely affected and avoid diluting the beneficial impact of 
the awards. 
Finally, courts should allow plaintiffs to have input as to where the 
funds should be directed.  Plaintiffs should be given the opportunity to 
choose, with court approval, the recipient charitable organization.  Judges’ 
authority should be limited to approving recommended beneficiaries 
instead of selecting beneficiaries.  Limiting a judge’s authority in this 
manner stamps out any concerns that judges will abuse their power to 
aid their own pet causes.  Courts could accept amicus briefs to help 
identify potential problems with the organizations that plaintiffs select, 
but absent glaring problems, and in the exercise of judicial discretion, 
judges should give fair deference to the organization of the plaintiff’s 
choice. 
In the end, as victims of defendants’ egregious conduct, plaintiffs are 
often well suited to assess the needs of similarly situated victims.  The 
wisdom gained from their experience should not be wasted, but should 
be considered by the courts.  By involving plaintiffs in this process, courts 
help to rehabilitate injury to plaintiffs’ dignity caused by defendants’ 
conduct and bestow upon plaintiffs a sense of civic honor.  Plaintiffs can 
feel proud of their role as private attorneys general and shirk the 




 133. See Welles, supra note 94, at 205 –06 (defining “nonprofit organization” and establishing guidelines for potential award beneficiaries). 
